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Abstract. In this paper we introduce two models of opinion dynamics in oligopoly
markets and apply them to a situation, where a new entrant challenges two incumbents
of the same size. The models differ in the way the two forces influencing consumer
choice – (local) social interactions and (global) advertising – interact. We study the
general behavior of the models using the Mean Field Approach and Monte Carlo
simulations and calibrate the models to data from the Polish telecommunications
market. For one of the models criticality is observed – below a certain critical level
of advertising the market approaches a lock-in situation, where one market leader
dominates the market and all other brands disappear. Interestingly, for both models
the best fits to real data are obtained for conformity level p ∈ (0.3, 0.4). This agrees
very well with the conformity level found by Solomon Asch in his famous social
experiment.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, outflow dynamics, agent-based model, oligopoly
market, advertising, mobile telephony.
1. Introduction
Economic and social studies suggest that the decision of a consumer to purchase a
particular product depends not only on price and product quality, but also on social
effects and advertising exposure [1, 2]. On one hand, the social validation phenomenon
is a powerful motivation for our actions. People listen to their family and friends’
experiences of network operators, price plans and brands of handsets [3, 4]. The tariffs
themselves add to this clustering effect by giving preferences (including lower prices) to
connections within a network or even within a group of friends.
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On the other hand, the willingness to pay for a product is increased by
advertisements [5]. Advertising is used to reinforce the brand image as it is used as
an indicator of quality and makes services such as telecommunications more tangible
to consumers. Indeed, Turnbull et al. [3] found advertising to be quite an important
source of information when purchasing a mobile phone, but not as important as family
and friends. At the same time, mobile telephony is the most heavily advertised business
in many countries [6]. It seems that the operators are aware of the power of advertising.
And since they cannot influence social relations directly, they are doing the second best
thing – advertising.
But what affects consumer decisions more? Is it social influence or advertising?
The aim of this paper is to build a model of the mobile telecommunications market in
Poland, where three major operators (Plus, Era and Orange) fight an on-going battle
for domination. To tackle this problem we introduce two models of opinion dynamics
in oligopoly markets, which differ in the way the two forces influencing consumer choice
– (local) social interactions and (global) advertising – interact. We study the general
behavior of the models: steady states in terms of market shares for the entire space of
parameters, as well as calibrate them to real data. Hopefully, the obtained results will
add to the understanding of oligopoly market behavior and help in answering the above
question.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we provide a short overview
of the mobile phone market in Poland. In Section 3 we discuss the factors influencing
our choice of the mobile operator and introduce two opinion dynamics models. We
conclude the Section by presenting Mean Field equations for both models. In Section
4 we present the obtained results both in terms of Monte Carlo simulations and Mean
Field approximations. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and discuss possible follow-up
research.
2. The Market
2.1. The Mobile Telecommunications Market in Poland
Mobile telephony in Poland dates back to 1992, when PTK (brand Centertel) started
offering services in the analog NMT450i system. The first mobile phones were the ‘bricks’
(Nokia Cityman 450) and the ‘radiators’ (Motorola 2000, Talkman 900). Their price
exceeded the average annual salary at that time. In the early 1990s mobile phones were
the synonym of success in the rapidly developing Polish economy. Second generation
services (GSM 900 MHz) were offered in 1996 by two new operators – PTC (brand
Era) and Polkomtel (brand Plus). Only then, through competition and the policy of
subsidizing mobile phones have they become more popular. Centertel started loosing
clients due to worser quality of transmission and bulkier handsets and in 1998 decided
to launch a digital system of its own – Idea Centertel (rebranded to Orange in 2005)
working in the GSM 1800 MHz system. In late 1998 all three operators made a next
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major step forward and introduced prepaid services. This move eventually led to mobile
phones becoming everyday appliances.
In 2000 the operators received concessions for new frequencies and since then all
three have used both the 900 and 1800 MHz systems. This was a great opportunity
especially for Idea Centertel, which has been using the shorter range, city-concentrated
GSM 1800 MHz system and had three times fewer clients than the two competitors. The
next major technological change – introduction of the third generation UMTS telephony
in 2004 – did not have a noticeable impact on the market. Even today there are not
too many users of this system. In March 2007 a fourth player entered the market –
P4 (brand Play), but by the end of 2007 its market share was still negligible (2.05% in
terms of the number of users and 1.28% in terms of net revenues).
During the last 15 years the number of mobile phone users has been steadily
increasing. In 2007 the number of sold SIM cards exceeded 40 million yielding a market
penetration of 108.6%; the penetration by active SIM cards was estimated at 90.9% [7].
Compared to other European countries this is not a spectacular result.
The mobile phone market is a typical example of an oligopoly. Entry barriers
(including infrastructure and concessions) are extremely high. As of end 2007 there
were four operators in the Polish market [7]:
• Polkomtel S.A. (brand: Plus, prepaid brands: Simplus and Sami Swoi)
• Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa Sp. z o.o. (brand: Era, prepaid brands: Tak Tak and
Heyah)
• Polska Telefonia Komo´rkowa Centertel Sp. z o.o. (brand Orange; includes prepaid
services)
• P4 Sp. z o.o. (brand Play ; includes prepaid services)
There were also a few Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) – brands mBank
mobile, myAvon, WPmobi, Simfonia and Ezo – but their market share was negligible
(0.12% in terms of the number of users and 0.02% in terms of net revenues as of end
2007).
In this paper we study the period from the end of year 2000, when the technological
constraints of the three major operators were leveled out, till the third quarter of 2007,
see Figure 1. We will only consider these three players (and generally denote them later
in the text by their main brands – Plus, Era and Orange) as the remaining operators
have not played a visible role in the studied period.
For a long time these three players have fought an on-going battle for domination
in the Polish mobile phone market. But despite the competition, they have sustained
relatively high prices for their services and tempted new clients with cheap handsets
instead (similar strategies have been observed in other markets as well [8]). Only when
the market has saturated (2004-2005), the operators have started attracting the less
rich clients. First, by lowering the prices for prepaid connections, next by lowering the
prices for subscription (postpaid) services. The latter move has reversed the dominating
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Figure 1. Left panels: The cumulative number of SIM cards sold and the total income
(i.e., jointly for all three major market players) from the first quarter of 2001 till the 3rd
quarter of 2007. A steady upward trend can be observed in both cases, with noticeable
seasonality in income figures. Right panels: Market structure in terms of SIM cards
sold and income. The turmoil around PTC led to a depreciation of the company’s
leading brand Era and, consequently, the company’s financial standing.
trend – instead of offering cheap handsets the operators have started luring clients with
cheap connections.
Apart from the service-handset price competition, the operators have always fought
a war on the billboards and in radio, TV and internet commercials. In fact, in the last
ten years the three major mobile market players have been the most heavily advertised
companies in Poland. Nearly every week they make the top ten list, if not the top three.
Mobile phone ads are visible everywhere and it is hard to imagine a new market entry
without an intensive advertising campaign.
2.2. The turmoil around PTC
Writing about the Polish mobile telecommunications market we have to mention the
controversial events related to the dispute over 48% of shares of PTC (owner of the
brand Era). Four companies were involved in this: Elektrim, Elektrim Telekomunikacja,
Deutsche Telekom and Vivendi. The dispute started in 1999, when Elektrim bought
15.8% of shares from other shareholders (Kulczyk Holding and BRE Bank). At the same
time, another shareholder – Deutsche Telekom (DT) – was convinced that it had the
preemtion right to those shares and in December 2000 filed a case in the Arbitrage Court
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in Vienna. Legal actions ended in November 2004. In the meantime, the shareholder
structure changed and the sentence did not hurt Electrim but a French company Vivendi.
In 1999 Vivendi bought 49% of shares of Elektrim Telekomunikacja (ET), a company
to which Elektrim transferred its PTC shares in 2000. In 2001 Vivendi bought another
2% of shares of ET gaining control not only over ET but also over PTC. However, the
Arbitrage Court ruled that the transfer of shares from Elektrim to ET was illegal. The
Provincial Court in Warsaw (Sa¸d Rejonowy w Warszawie) recognized this decision and
48% of PTC shares returned to Elektrim. And then all the fuss began.
In February 2005 the Provincial Court in Warsaw made changes in the National
Company Register (Krajowy Rejestr Sa¸dowy, KRS), including a new board of directors
and a new supervisory board appointed by Elektrim in cooperation with DT. ET and
Vivendi did not accept this, which resulted in a blockade of PTC’s headquarters by the
former management. Vivendi also filed a complaint to the Polish government, backed
by a bilateral agreement between France and Poland on observance of international
investments. After some time the new board of directors gained control over PTC’s
offices and Elektrim started negotiations with DT and Vivendi on the sale of PTC’s
shares. However, in August 2005 the roles changed: the District Court in Warsaw (Sa¸d
Okre¸gowy w Warszawie; playing the role of the court of appeal for the Provincial Court)
reversed the decision of the lower instance and sent the case back to the Provincial Court
in Warsaw. In November 2005 the Provincial Court made changes in KRS in favor of
ET. This time the Elektrim and DT appointed board blocked PTC’s headquarters. A
number of managing directors resigned. PTC started to have liquidity problems.
It seems that the case was finally resolved in March 2006, when the Warsaw Court
of Appeal (Sa¸d Apelacyjny w Warszawie) upheld the sentence of the Arbitrage Court
in Vienna from November 2004. The situation of PTC stabilized, although courts
of different instances were still processing the case for two more years. During this
turmoil Era lost its pole position in the mobile phone market in Poland (Fig. 1). This
happened despite the fact that advertising remained high, both in terms of advertising
expenditures and Gross Rating Points (Fig. 2). Some authors [9] consider the Gross
Rating Points (GRP), i.e. the percentage number of targeted viewers contacted times
the average number of contacts per targeted viewer, to be much more representative
of the actual advertising campaign. In our case, however, the advertising expenditures
and GRP numbers yield a very similar picture. Also the correlation between these two
variables is very high and for individual companies ranges from ρ = 0.92 to 0.95 in the
studied period.
A March 2006 survey performed by PBS (www.pbsdga.pl), a Polish market research
company, sheds some light on the discord between PTC’s market share and advertising
expenditures. Nearly 40% of respondents (and over 55% of corporate respondents)
declare that news of an uncertain future of the company would make them change the
operator. Also over 30% of respondents would change the operator if serious charges
were brought against the company’s management.
Outflow Dynamics in Modeling Oligopoly Markets 6
2002 2004 2006 2008
0
100
200
300
400
500
To
ta
l G
RP
 (x
 10
0)
Year
2002 2004 2006 2008
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rc
en
t o
f T
ot
al
 G
RP
Year
2002 2004 2006 2008
0
50
100
150
200
To
ta
l E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(m
ln 
PL
N)
Year
2002 2004 2006 2008
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rc
en
t o
f T
ot
al
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
Year
Plus
ERA
Orange
Plus
ERA
Orange
Figure 2. Left panels: Quarterly Gross Rating Points (GRP) and advertising
expenditures (jointly for all three major market players) for the same period as in
Figure 1. The processes are not identical, however, contrary to some reports [9] they
are not that different (the correlation for individual companies ranges from ρ = 0.92 to
0.95). Right panels: Market structure in terms of GRP and advertising expenditures.
3. The Model
3.1. Factors Influencing Our Choice of the Mobile Operator
We generally prefer to make decisions consciously. In an attempt to make the best
choice possible we study the operators’ offers: special deals, price plans, offered handsets,
loyalty programs, network coverage and quality of transmission. Especially subscription
clients spend long hours on studying and weighting these factors. Quite often, however,
the offers are very similar when we take all factors into account and it is very hard to
make a decision based only on simple statistical comparisons.
Economic and social studies suggest that the decision of a consumer to purchase
a particular product depends not only on price and product quality, but also on social
effects and advertising exposure [1, 2]. Moreover, links in a social network and the
stream of advertisements may lead to common actions of large groups of consumers and
induce correlation between consumers’ decisions [10].
On one hand, the social validation phenomenon is a powerful motivation for our
actions. People listen to their family and friends’ experiences of network operators,
price plans and brands of handsets. Turnbull et al. [3] found family and friends to
be the main source of information used by UK consumers when purchasing a mobile
phone. A similar effect was observed in the Thai market [4]. Note that tariffs add to
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this clustering effect by giving preferences (including lower prices) to connections within
a network or even within a group of friends.
On the other hand, according to Becker and Murphy [5] the willingness to pay for
a product is increased by advertisements. This implies that when a positive news arrive
at a consumer, they raise his/her perception of utility of that brand. Advertising is used
to reinforce the brand image as it is used as an indicator of quality and makes services
such as telecommunications more tangible to consumers. Indeed, Turnbull et al. [3]
found advertising to be quite an important source of information when purchasing a
mobile phone in the UK (but not as important as family and friends). At the same
time, mobile telephony is the most heavily advertised business in many countries, see
Section 2 and Ref. [6]. It seems that the operators are aware of the power of advertising.
And since they cannot influence social relations directly, they are doing the second best
thing – advertising.
3.2. Building the Model
From the previous Section we know that social influence plays a major role in selecting
a mobile phone company. But can we be more precise and say which type of influence
is more and which is less important for the decision making process?
In the early 1950s Solomon Asch reported an ingenious series of experiments on
social influence (for a fascinating review see Levine [11]). Asch used several measures
of social influence but here we recall only two of his results [12], which help us answer
the question ‘Which aspect of the influence of a majority is more important – the size
of the majority or its unanimity?’:
(i) Asch found that minority participants confronting a unanimous majority were often
capable of resisting social influence. When a subject was confronted with only a
single individual who contradicted his answers, he was swayed little: he continued
to answer independently and correctly in nearly all trials. When the opposition was
increased to two, the pressure became substantial: minority subjects now accepted
the wrong answer 13.6 % of the time. Under the pressure of a majority of three, the
subjects’ errors jumped to 32 %. But further increases in the size of the majority
apparently did not increase the weight of the pressure substantially. Clearly the
size of the opposition is important only up to a point.
(ii) Asch also found that he could increase independence dramatically – the presence
of a social supporter reduced the total number of yielding responses from 32% to
5.5% [12]. The power of social support was further demonstrated in a study showing
that participants were far more independent when they were opposed by a seven-
person majority and had a partner than when they were opposed by a three-person
majority and did not have a partner [11].
A number of later experiments showed that an individual who breaks the unanimity
principle reduces social pressure of the group dramatically [13]. This observation was
recently expressed in a simple one dimensional USDF (‘United we Stand, Divided we
Outflow Dynamics in Modeling Oligopoly Markets 8
Fall’) model of opinion formation [14]. The model was later renamed ‘the Sznajd model’
by Stauffer et al. [15] and generalized on a two dimensional square lattice. The crucial
difference between the Sznajd model and other Ising-type models of opinion dynamics
[16, 17, 18] is that information flows outward from the center nodes to the surrounding
neighborhood (so called outflow dynamics [19]) and not the other way around. Ising-
type models with outflow dynamics have been successfully applied in marketing, finance
and politics; for reviews see [20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
The aim of this paper is to build a model of the mobile telecommunications market
in Poland, where three major operators (Plus, Era and Orange) fight an on-going battle
for domination. The market is represented by a two dimensional L × L lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Each site of the lattice is occupied independently by an
individual (a customer), who is characterized by a variable Si = 1, 2, 3, i = 1, ..., L
2,
that represents his/her mobile operator. In each time step (∆τ) one of the L2 customers
is selected randomly (random sequential updating) and then together with his/her three
neighbors forms a 2 × 2 panel. We measure the time so that the speed of all processes
remains constant when L→∞, and thus one update takes time ∆τ = 1/L2.
Two forces influencing consumer choice are considered: (local) social interactions
and (global) advertising. Some empirical studies [3] suggest that of the two forces social
interactions play a greater role. Following the unanimity principle discovered by social
scientists we assume that only an unanimous panel (all four customers in the panel
use the same mobile network) persuades all eight of its nearest neighbors to switch the
operator to the one favored by the panel. In lack of unanimity the eight neighboring
individuals make their choice based on advertisements: independently with probability
1 − p each of them switches the operator. The choice of the operator is determined by
the relative advertising level (a kind of an external field [25, 26, 27]). With probability
h1 he/she chooses company 1 (say, Plus), with probability h2 company 2 (Era) and with
probability h3 = 1−h1−h2 company 3 (Orange). Obviously, the customer may ‘switch’
to the same operator, i.e., stay with the original one. In this model conformity (social
influence) comes in first, then advertising affects the customers. Hence, we will call the
model – Conformity First (CF).
A different idea of incorporating advertising in a duopoly setting was proposed by
the social psychologist Andrzej Nowak at the GIACS summer school ‘Applications of
Complex Systems to Social Sciences’ [28]. He suggested to generalize the USDF model
by flipping each up opinion down (Si = 1 → Si = −1) with probability γ and each
down opinion up (Si = −1→ Si = 1) with probability β as a result of global effects like
advertising through mass media. The traditional conformity rule was applied to each
of the neighbors (of the panel) independently with probability α. In this model (called
‘Nowak-Sznajd’ by Wo loszyn et al. [28]) conformity influences individuals parallel to
advertising. We borrow Nowak’s idea to construct our second model and call it CAP
(Conformity and Advertising Parallel).
In the CAP model, for each of the the eight nearest neighbors of the selected
panel we independently apply either the social (with probability p) or advertising (with
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probability 1 − p) forces. All neighbors selected to be influenced by social interactions
switch the operator to the one favored by the panel, but only if the panel is unanimous.
In lack of unanimity the selected neighbors do not perform any action. The remaining
neighbors (selected to be influenced by advertising) are subdued to the same rules as
in the CF model. Namely, the choice of the operator is determined by the relative
advertising level: with probability h1 the individual chooses company 1, with probability
h2 company 2 and with probability h3 = 1− h1 − h2 company 3. Note, that in contrast
to the CF model, in the CAP model an unanimous panel does not guarantee conformity.
3.3. Mean Field Approach
Let us denote by N1(t), N2(t) and N3(t) the number at time t of Plus ’s, Era’s and
Orange’s customers, respectively. Further, define by c1(t) =
N1(t)
L2
, c2(t) =
N2(t)
L2
and
c3(t) =
N3(t)
L2
the respective market shares (concentrations). Of course, the normalization
condition is fulfilled, i.e. ∀t c1(t) + c2(t) + c3(t) = 1. We measure the time so that the
speed of all processes remains constant when L → ∞, and thus one update takes time
∆τ = 1/L2. Each basic time step ∆t = 1 consists of L2 updatings, hence the balance
(evolution) equation takes the form:
Ns(t+ 1)−Ns(t) = L
2(incremental changes− decremental changes), (1)
where s = 1, 2, 3.
The incremental and decremental changes are (slightly) different in the two models.
For instance, in the CAP model the number N1(t) of Plus ’s (operator #1) clients can
increase in time due to the following events:
• an Era client (operator #2) follows Plus ’s advertising – the probability of such an
event is equal to (1− p)h1c2(t);
• an Orange client (operator #3) follows Plus ’s advertising – the probability of such
an event is equal to (1− p)h1c3(t);
• an Era client subdues to the unanimous panel of operator #1 – the probability of
such an event is equal to pc1(t)
4c2(t);
• an Orange client subdues to the unanimous panel of operator #1 – the probability
of such an event is equal to pc1(t)
4c3(t).
Similarly, the number N1(t) of Plus ’s clients can decrease in time due to the following
events:
• a Plus client follows Era’s advertising – the probability of such an event is equal to
(1− p)h2c1(t);
• a Plus client follows Orange’s advertising – the probability of such an event is equal
to (1− p)h3c1(t);
• a Plus client subdues to the unanimous panel of operator #2 – the probability of
such an event is equal to pc2(t)
4c1(t);
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• a Plus client subdues to the unanimous panel of operator #3 – the probability of
such an event is equal to pc3(t)
4c1(t).
Now, we can put down the balance equation for the first operator:
N1(t + 1)−N1(t) = L
2[(1− p)h1c2(t) + (1− p)h1c3(t)
+ pc1(t)
4c2(t) + pc1(t)
4c3(t)
− (1− p)h2c1(t)− (1− p)h3c1(t)
− pc2(t)
4c1(t)− pc3(t)
4c1(t)]. (2)
Dividing both sides of the equation by L2 and denoting cs(t) by cs and cs(t + 1) by c
′
s
,
for s = 1, 2, 3, after simple algebraic transformations we obtain:
c′1 − c1 = (1− p)h1(c2 + c3)− c1(1− p)(h2 + h3)
+ pc1c2(c
3
1 − c
3
2) + pc1c3(c
3
1 − c
3
3). (3)
Applying the normalization conditions (c2+ c3 = 1− c1 and h2+h3 = 1−h1) we obtain
the complete set of evolution equations for the CAP model:
c′1 − c1 = (1− p)(h1 − c1) + pc1
[
c2(c
3
1 − c
3
2) + c3(c
3
1 − c
3
3)
]
,
c′2 − c2 = (1− p)(h2 − c2) + pc2
[
c1(c
3
2 − c
3
1) + c3(c
3
2 − c
3
3)
]
,
c′3 − c3 = (1− p)(h3 − c3) + pc3
[
c1(c
3
3 − c
3
1) + c2(c
3
3 − c
3
2)
]
. (4)
Analogously, we can derive the evolution equations for the CF model:
c′1 − c1 = (1− p)(h1 − c1) + c1
[
c2(c
3
1 − c
3
2) + c3(c
3
1 − c
3
3)
]
,
c′2 − c2 = (1− p)(h2 − c2) + c2
[
c1(c
3
2 − c
3
1) + c3(c
3
2 − c
3
3)
]
,
c′3 − c3 = (1− p)(h3 − c3) + c3
[
c1(c
3
3 − c
3
1) + c2(c
3
3 − c
3
2)
]
. (5)
Note, that for p = 1 the CAP and CF evolution equations are identical and that the
differences increase with decreasing p. Note also, that the sets of evolution equations
(4) and (5) can be easily solved numerically, see the discussion in Section 4.
3.4. The Model of the Polish Telecommunications Market (2000-2007)
Recall from Section 2 that back in year 2000 (beginning of the study period) three mobile
operators were offering their services in the Polish market: a ‘new entrant’ (Orange; until
2005 under the brand Idea Centertel) was challenging two incumbents (Plus and Era).
The market shares of the two incumbents were nearly the same in terms of income (ca.
40% each; see the bottom right panel in Figure 1), but not in terms of the number
of SIM cards sold. Following W loszczowska [29], in this study we use income as the
measure of market share. There are two major reasons for this. First, the published
data concern the number of SIM cards sold, not the actual number of users of a given
network. Some of the cards are not active and some clients are using more than one SIM
card (private, business, internet). Second, different categories of clients use the phones
with different intensities. This could be accounted for by assigning more lattice sites to
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some clients, but for the sake of parsimony we have decided not to execute this option.
Consequently, in our model one lattice node represents an average (in terms of income)
client.
The market state where a new entrant challenges two incumbents of the same size
allows us to make further simplifications. We limit the rich parameter space (p, hs, cs(0))
to the situation where the initial concentrations of clients and the levels of advertisement
of Plus and Era are equal, i.e. c1(0) = c2(0) ≡ c0 and h1 = h2 ≡ h, respectively.
4. The Results
For the sets of rules governing the behavior of mobile phone users (see Section 3.2), we
study the system via Monte Carlo (MC) simulations and compare the final steady states
with those obtained from the Mean Field Approach (MFA), see equations (4) and (5).
4.1. Monte Carlo Simulations
We present results for lattice size 100×100, although we have performed simulations for
other L’s. In all simulations we took initially c0 of Plus customers, c0 of Era customers
and 1 − 2c0 of Orange customers randomly distributed on the lattice. The level of
advertisement h is the same for Plus and Era and constant throughout the simulations.
For Orange the level is equal to 1− 2h.
During the simulations, we have observed that after a transient (‘termalization’)
time tT the concentrations (market shares) reach a final level c∞ around which they
fluctuate. Due to these fluctuations, we define the final value of concentration as the
mean value over a time interval ∆T :
c∞ =
1
∆T
tT+∆T∑
t=tT
c(t). (6)
For both models (CAP and CF), the final steady state c∞ was reached in all performed
simulations independently of the parameters (p, h) and the initial conditions (c0).
Moreover, averaging over different ∆T ’s (10, 50, 100) did not influence the results. For
each set of parameters (p, h, c0) we performed 10
3 independent Monte Carlo simulations
and calculated c∞ by averaging over all samples. The final steady concentration c∞
results are presented in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6.
For the CAP and CF models two qualitatively different regimes are observed
depending on conformity level p. For p ≤ 0.7 the final steady state c∞ does not depend
on the initial concentration c0, i.e. it is a function of only two parameters: c∞ = f(p, h).
In the ‘low conformity’ regime (p ≤ 0.7) substantial differences between the studied
models can be seen. For the CAP model (see the left panel in Figure 3), the dependence
between final concentration c∞ and advertising level h is almost linear, but generally
c∞ = f(p, h) is an S-shaped function of h. Deviations from linear dependence increase
with p. A different behavior is observed for the CF model (see the left panel in Figure
Outflow Dynamics in Modeling Oligopoly Markets 12
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Figure 3. MC and MFA results for the CAP model and p ≤ 0.7
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Figure 4. MC results for the CAP model and p ≥ 0.7
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Figure 5. MC and MFA results for the CF model and p ≤ 0.7
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Figure 6. MC results for the CF model and p ≥ 0.7
5). A critical value hc of the advertising level exists:
c∞ = 0 for h < hc,
c∞ > 0 for h > hc. (7)
In the ‘high conformity’ regime (p ≥ 0.7), the final steady state c∞ depends not only
on conformity and advertising, but also on initial concentration c0. Nevertheless, in
the CAP model the dependence between c∞ and h is still an S-shaped function and no
critical value of h exists (see Figure 4). This is in sharp contrast to the CF model for
which hc exists (see Figure 6). For p ≥ 0.7 the dependence between the final and initial
concentration grows with conformity level in both models. This is an understandable
result, because for high values of p interactions between individuals dominate over the
external field (advertising). On the other hand, for high values of p the dependence
between c∞ and h should decrease. In the limit (p = 1) only interactions between
customers exist and there is no external field, thus no dependence on h is expected.
This is confirmed by MC results (see Figures 4 and 6).
4.2. Mean Field Results
In Section 3.3 we have derived general sets of evolution equations describing how
concentrations change in time for both models. These sets of equations can be
easily solved numerically. Recall from Section 3.4, that we limit the parameter space
(p, hs, cs(0)) to the situation where the initial concentrations of clients and the levels of
advertisement of Plus and Era are equal, i.e. c1(0) = c2(0) ≡ c0 and h1 = h2 ≡ h,
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Figure 7. MFA results for the CAP model and p ≥ 0.7
respectively. Then the MFA equations (4) and (5) lead to the final fixed point
c∞ = f(c0, p, h) independently of the parameters (c0, p, h). In agreement with MC
simulations, the MFA equations lead to two regimes depending on conformity level p:
• For p ≤ 0.7 the final steady state c∞ does not depend on initial concentration c0,
i.e. it is function of only two parameters c∞ = f(p, h), see Figures 3 and 5.
• For p ≥ 0.7 the final steady state c∞ depends not only on conformity and advertising
level, but also on initial concentration c0. In this regime dependence between
the final and initial concentration grows with conformity level p. On the other
hand, dependence between c∞ and h decreases and in the limit (p = 1) there is no
dependence on h, see Figures 7 and 8.
For the CAP model, MFA and MC results are in a high agreement both in the ‘low’
(see Figure 3) and ‘high conformity’ regime (Figures 4 and 7). The dependence between
final concentration c∞ and advertising level h is an S-shaped function of h and with
decreasing p it approaches a linear function: c∞ = h. This similarity indicates a mean
field character, i.e. lack of spacial fluctuations, of the CAP model. On the contrary,
for the CF model MFA results are qualitatively different from those obtained by Monte
Carlo simulations, especially in the ‘low conformity’ regime. Most importantly, there is
no critical value of h within the Mean Field Approach.
Monte Carlo results show that, generally, the relationship between market share and
advertising level is less straightforward for the CP model due to stronger clusterization
caused by a greater role of social validation. Fluctuations within the CP model were
able to ‘produce’ a critical phase transition in terms of advertising. Below the critical
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Figure 8. MFA results for the CF model and p ≥ 0.7
value hc(p) (of incumbents’ advertising) only the entrant survives. The existence of
fluctuations is the reason why MFA for the CP model does not give as compatible
results as for the CAP model. It should be noticed that although a critical value of
advertising does not exist within the MFA, MFA results still give more complicated
dependences between market share and advertising for the CP model than for the CAP
model.
4.3. Fitting to real data
Up till now we have been investigating general features and differences between CAP
and CP models. We have found that generally the CF model is more interesting from a
statistical physics point of view. Now we would like to check which model, if any, better
describes real data from the Polish telecommunications market.
The results mentioned below refer to computer simulations for a 100× 100 square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The initial concentrations cs(0), s = 1, 2, 3,
were set to the market shares of Plus, Era and Orange, respectively, in terms of income
for the end of year 2000 (see Section 3.4). The levels of advertising hs(t), s = 1, 2, 3, were
set to the respective percentages of total advertising expenditures for the 27 consecutive
quarters (t = 1, ..., 27), see the bottom right panel in Figure 2, with one important
change. Namely, due to the turmoil around Era (see Section 2.2), Era’s advertising
levels h2(t) were decreased in the years 2005-2006 (t = 17, ..., 24) by 10%, a value that
was found to best represent the inefficiency of advertising in the turmoil period [29].
Finally, the time scale had to be set. We have decided to take such a number of time
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Figure 9. Market shares in terms of income for the three operators (Plus, ERA and
Orange) and the model generated 95% bounds for conformity level p = 0.4. The 95%
bounds are obtained as the 97.5% quantile line (upper bound) and the 2.5% quantile
line (lower bound) based on 1000 simulated trajectories of each model (CF and CAP).
steps ∆τ as to allow each client to change operator once every two years (on average):
100×100
8
× 7.75
2
= 4219. The rationale for this comes from the fact that in Poland the
standard agreement for subscription customers concerns a two year period. To simplify
calculations the number 4219 was replaced by 4212, which is divisible by 27.
Simulation results are presented in Figure 9. The market shares in terms of income
for the three operators (Plus, ERA and Orange) and the CF and CAP model generated
95% bounds are displayed. The 95% bounds are obtained as the 97.5% quantile line
(upper bound) and the 2.5% quantile line (lower bound) based on 1000 simulated
trajectories of each model. The conformity level was set to p = 0.4. This choice is
not accidental. For both models the best fits to real data were obtained for conformity
level p ∈ (0.3, 0.4). Interestingly, this agrees very well with the conformity level found
by Asch in his famous social experiment [12]. Looking at the plots we can conclude that
slightly better fits were obtained for the CF model, partly because the bounds were
wider. However, we are fitting theoretical models to only one set of data and, hence, we
cannot definitely claim that the CF model describes reality better than the CAP model.
Obviously, tests with other empirical data sets are needed.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced two models of opinion dynamics in an oligopoly market.
We have applied them to a situation, where a new entrant challenges two incumbents
of the same size. Two forces influencing consumer choice were considered: (local) social
interactions and (global) advertising. In the Conformity First (CF) model, conformity –
but only in the case of unanimity – comes in first, then advertising affects the customers.
A different idea of incorporating advertising, borrowed from [28], was used to build
the Conformity and Advertising Parallel (CAP) model, where conformity influences
individuals parallel to advertising.
We have studied the general behavior of the models: steady states in terms of
market shares for the entire space of parameters, as well as calibrating models to real
data. For studying the steady states we have used both the Mean Field Approach and
Monte Carlo Simulations. This allowed us to determine the final steady state in terms of
market shares c∞ as a function of initial market shares c0, the level of conformity p and
the level of advertising h, i.e. c∞ = f(c0, p, h). It occurred that both techniques gave
very similar results for the CAP model, which indicated the lack of spacial fluctuation
within this model. Moreover, the dependence between the final value of market share c∞
and the level of advertising h was relatively simple and for small values of conformity
level p it approached a linear function c∞ = h. On the contrary, for the CP model
MFA gave qualitatively different results from MC simulations. Most importantly, there
was no critical value of advertising level within the Mean Field Approach, while such
a criticality was observed for Monte Carlo simulations. Similar results were obtained
earlier for a duopoly market [26].
Existence of the critical value is very interesting from the social point of view – below
a certain critical level of h the market approaches a lock-in situation, where one market
leader dominates the market and all other brands disappear. Groot [10] associates such
a market with a situation when consumers tend to copy the behavior of their neighbors
(high conformity level) and want the best value for their money, while an open market
arises when consumers ignore what their friends buy (low conformity level). In our
models the dependence between final market shares and the level of advertising becomes
less straightforward with increasing conformity. For low conformity levels advertising
becomes the main force of market changes. Furthermore, Robertson and Gatignon [30]
point out that incumbents have an advantage over new entrants, but firms without a
responsive defense strategy may forfeit that advantage (this happens in the CF model
below the critical advertising level).
We have also calibrated the models to real data from the Polish telecommunications
market. Slightly better fits were obtained for the CF model. However, we are fitting
theoretical models to only one set of data and, hence, we cannot definitely claim that
the CF model describes reality better than the CAP model. Obviously, more empirical
tests with real data are needed. Interestingly, for both models the best fits to real
data were obtained for conformity level p ∈ (0.3, 0.4). This agrees very well with the
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conformity level found by Asch in his famous social experiment [12]. One might say
that this agreement is accidental. On the other hand, it might occur that collecting
and analyzing data sets in different countries one could determine the ‘optimal’ level of
conformity for each country.
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